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Integrating Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) with cloud computing instances is a rapidly emerging
trend on commercial cloud computing platforms such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Huawei cloud, and
Alibaba cloud. Cloud FPGAs allow cloud users to build hardware accelerators to speed up the computation in
the cloud. However, since the cloud FPGA technology is still in its infancy, the security implications of this
integration of FPGAs in the cloud are not clear. In this paper, we survey the emerging field of cloud FPGA
security, providing a comprehensive overview of the security issues related to cloud FPGAs, and highlighting
future challenges in this research area.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The last few decades have witnessed tremendous growth in the need for high-speed computation
in the clouds. Solely using CPUs and GPUs can no longer meet the increasing performance demand,
in terms of latency, throughput, and efficiency. Due to this, FPGAs have been integrated into
cloud computation platforms to allow users to customize their hardware accelerators (to accelerate
computationally intensive tasks) in the clouds. Many commercial cloud providers have already
integrated or are integrating FPGAs in their cloud services platforms, e.g., Amazon [7], Huawei [67],
Alibaba [6], Microsoft [15], and Texas Advanced Computer Center [123]. Intel predicted in 2016
that one-third of the cloud computing instances would have an FPGA by 2020 [76]. Users can use
these cloud FPGAs to accelerate computationally intensive workloads like artificial intelligence
tasks, software-defined networking, big data analytics, genomics, electronic design automation,
and image and video processing [7, 92].
Comparing with traditional CPU-based or GPU-based cloud computation, FPGAs offer unique
advantages. In particular, FPGAs are an ideal platform to perform parallel computation with flexible
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Table 1. Comparison of cloud FPGA providers. The specifications and prices are based on [5–7, 15,
67, 97] as of March 2020, and the prices have been converted into US dollars for easy comparison.
*Microsoft Azure provides cloud FPGAs as hardware accelerators only for machine learning.
Provider # FPGAs/instance # virtual CPUs/instance Memory (GB) SSD (GB) Price/hour
Amazon 1/2/8 (Xilinx VU9P) 8/16/64 122/244/976 470/940/3760 $0.76 +
Huawei 1/2/4/8 (Xilinx VU9P) 8/32/64 88/224/352/448/708 N/A $0.98 +
Alibaba 1/2/4 (Intel Arria 10 GX 1150 or Xilinx VU9P) 4/8/16/28/32/56/64 16/32/60/64/112/120/128/224/256 N/A $0.14 +
Nimbix 1 (Xilinx Alevo U50/U200/U250/U280) 16/32/64 128 N/A $3.00 +
Azure ML∗ 1/2/4 (Intel Arria 10) N/A 112/224/448 N/A $0.33 +
datapath and control. Thus, they can speed up computation with high efficiency. We explain these
features in detail below.
• FPGAs can support massive parallelism in computation. For example, each FPGA on Amazon
cloud (Xilinx UltraScale+ VU9P) has more than two million customer-accessible FPGA pro-
grammable logic cells [101], and they can all run in parallel to accelerate computation. For
example, the instances on Amazon cloud accelerate the computing time by up to 100× [7].
• FPGAs are highly flexible in building a datapath with arbitrary width; e.g., if an application
needs a 9-bit integer, the user can configure the datapath to exact 9 bits without underutilizing
any computational resources, while in a CPU, it would require two bytes to store 9 bits.
Moreover, it is easier to use FPGAs to build a customized state machine to control the
computation on FPGAs, which is more efficient than using software for fine-grained controls.
In addition to these advantages, the cost of general-purpose commercial FPGA-based cloud
computing instances is meager: one Amazon EC2 f1.2xlarge instance, which has one FPGA board,
can cost as low as $0.76 per hour [7], and one basic Huawei FP1 instance costs about $0.98 per
hour [67]. Table 1 presents a summary of the platforms provided by leading FPGA cloud providers.
Users can choose proper specifications (e.g., the number and vendor of their FPGAs, the number of
CPU cores, and the size of memory) for their cloud computation.
FPGA-accelerated clouds can be beneficial to a large variety of sectors. Deep learning technology
has a wide range of applications. FPGA accelerators can boost the performance of deep learn-
ing technology, and thus accelerate numerous applications and services ranging from database
management to artificial intelligence [59, 140]. Microsoft Brainwave project has developed a deep
neural network architecture that can be synthesized on FPGAs to achieve ten to over thirty-five
teraflops [41, 91]. Also, FPGA accelerators can help speed up heavy computation tasks on video
classification and genome analysis, as these algorithms have a tremendous amount of parallelism
that can be exploited [31, 119, 130]. FPGA accelerators that provide over ten times speedup in
genome sequencing analysis are deployed on Amazon AWS F1 instances by Edico Genome [42].
FPGAs can also enhance database management systems. In particular, set-oriented queries in
database systems are suitable for FPGA computation, as a high degree of parallelism exists in
set data queries [95]. More complex analytic operations of data have been accelerated by FPGA
platforms tremendously [121]. Bing is currently powered by FPGA accelerators, which offer a 50%
improvement in throughput and a 25% reduction in latency [92].
Table 2. Comparison between cloud security, FPGA security, and cloud FPGA security.
Assets Under Attacks Threat Models Physical Accesses Programmable Hardware
Cloud Security Data Cloud & Clients N N
FPGA Security Data & H/W Design H/W Users & H/W Design Supply Chain Y Y
Cloud FPGA Security Data & H/W Design Cloud & Clients & H/W Design Supply Chain N Y
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Building programmable hardware in the clouds improves the performance of cloud-hosted
services significantly. However, this integration opens a new attack surface from an attacker’s
perspective. This is because FPGAs allow users to implement custom logic on them, unlike CPUs,
and GPUs. A variety of attacks have been demonstrated in recent research papers [115, 142], and
researchers are developing countermeasures to thwart the attacks on cloud FPGAs [81, 105]. This
paper surveys the broad landscape of cloud FPGA security research. It summarizes the state-of-the-
art research and points out future research directions.
We organize the whole paper in a way that it answers four fundamental research questions in
cloud FPGA security research one by one:
(1) What are the security threats when FPGAs are introduced in a cloud platform?
(2) In what different ways can a malicious user attack an FPGA in the cloud?
(3) How to defend against such attacks on cloud FPGAs?
(4) How can we use FPGAs as a tool to enhance cloud security?
To better understand the differences between cloud security, FPGA security, and cloud FPGA
security, we create Table 2 to show the comparison. Most importantly, the threat models of these
three security research areas are different, and cloud FPGAs have the largest attack surface. In
general, in the scenarios of cloud computing (cloud security and cloud FPGA security), we do not
assume that users (either attackers or victims) have physical access to the computation resources.
Additionally, traditional cloud security research does not assume that the underlying hardware can
be maliciously altered by attackers (except the case of hardware Trojans). But with programmable
hardware in the clouds, an attacker can create a hardware foothold in the system to launch attacks
that were not possible before, e.g., side-channel attacks. In terms of the assets that defenders need
to protect, hardware designs on FPGAs are valuable targets for FPGA security and cloud FPGA
security attackers, in addition to the data that is computed or stored on the devices.
Organization.We introduce the background knowledge and the threat models of cloud FPGAs in
Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. We survey the literature on attacks for a variety of threat
models in Section 4. As there is a vast amount of research on power-based side-channel attacks
and ring oscillator (RO) design variants, we provide the two case studies in Section 5. We discuss
the countermeasures against the above attacks in Section 6. Researchers have introduced various
methods to use FPGAs to enhance system security (i.e., the security of cloud computation), which
is presented in Section 7. The recent related surveys and the differences between our paper and
other surveys are discussed in Section 8. We share our thoughts on future challenges and provide
concluding remarks in Section 9. We categorize existing research on attacking or protecting cloud
FPGAs in Table 3 as a systematic review.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Field Programmable Gate Arrays
FPGAs are integrated circuits composed of programmable blocks, allowing a user to program the
circuit functionality as needed even after fabrication. Fig. 1 shows a typical architecture of an FPGA.
The architecture includes an array of configuration logic blocks (CLBs), switch boxes (SBs), and
input/output pins. CLBs are composed of lookup tables (LUTs), flip-flops, and multiplexers. Each
CLB can be programmed to implement any Boolean function with n or fewer inputs, where n is the
input size of the LUT. The SBs in an FPGA can be configured to connect CLBs, so multiple CLBs can
jointly construct a larger circuit and thus perform more complex computation. Input/output pins
connect an FPGA with the outside world, such as power supply, clock signals, and other peripherals.
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 2020.
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Table 3. Categorization of cloud FPGA literature based on (1) threat model, (2) attack class, and
(3) whether the study is about attack or defense or both.
Threat model Attack class
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Huffmire et al. [68] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note et al. [98] ✓ ✓ ✓
Endo et al. [38] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Benz et al. [21] ✓ ✓ ✓
Gnad et al. [55] ✓ ✓ ✓
Schellenberg et al. [115] ✓ ✓ ✓
Gnad et al. [56] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Schellenberg et al. [116] ✓ ✓ ✓
Hategekimana et al. [63] ✓ ✓ ✓
Yazdanshenas et al. [139] ✓ ✓ ✓
Zhao et al. [142] ✓ ✓ ✓
Krautter et al. [83] ✓ ✓ ✓
Ramesh et al. [107] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bag et al. [16] ✓ ✓ ✓
Provelengios et al. [105] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Tian et al. [124] ✓ ✓ ✓
Sugawara et al. [120] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Alam et al. [3] ✓ ✓ ✓
Weissman et al. [131] ✓ ✓ ✓
Krautter et al. [81] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Krautter et al. [82] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mahmoud et al. [87] ✓ ✓ ✓
Gnad et al. [54] ✓ ✓ ✓
Elnaggar et al. [37] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Gravellier et al. [57] ✓ ✓ ✓
Provelengios et al. [106] ✓ ✓ ✓
Giechaskiel et al. [49] ✓ ✓ ✓
Giechaskiel et al. [48] ✓ ✓ ✓
Giechaskiel et al. [52] ✓ ✓ ✓
Luo et al. [86] ✓ ✓ ✓
Matas et al. [90] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Giechaskiel et al. [50] ✓ ✓ ✓
Giechaskiel et al. [51] ✓ ✓ ✓
Glamocanin et al. [53] ✓ ✓ ✓
Krieg et al. [84] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Fig. 1. An FPGA has Configuration Logic Blocks (CLB), switch-boxes (SB), and input/output cells.
Each CLB consists of a Look-Up Table (LUT), a flip-flop (FF), and a MUX.
2.2 FPGA Design Flow
Fig. 2 shows the typical FPGA design flow. A designer designs the target system in terms of Hardware
Description Language (HDL) codes, e.g., Verilog HDL or VHDL. After the HDL codes have been
simulated and verified for correctness, they are synthesized and translated to a netlist by FPGA
synthesis tools (e.g., Xilinx Vivado [135] or Xilinx ISE [134]). The netlist describes how the hardware
components, such as LUTs and registers, are connected. The FPGA synthesis tool then maps the
components to the actual hardware resources on a specified FPGA. Next, the routes between each
component are optimized to meet the timing constraints and other physical constraints given by
the user. The end goal of the design process is a bitstream file, which is a string of 0s and 1s. After
the bitstream file is loaded onto an FPGA, the FPGA will function as intended by the user.
To reduce the design time and the verification efforts, a designer can specify the design using
a high-level language (e.g., C or MATLAB). This also allows a developer, who does not have
Timing analysis
HLS
HDL code
Functional 
simulation
High-level 
language
Optional
Synthesis & 
translation
Physical & 
timing 
constraints
Bitstream 
generation
always @(posedge 
CLK)
begin
    if (EN)
        Q <= D
end
Map Place & route
FPGA 
programming
Fig. 2. FPGA design flow: The yellow box indicates that the step inside that box is optional. The
blue box shows the steps which give a HDL code as an output. The grey box indicates synthesis
of the HDL code and its translation. The red box shows the mapping of the logic to LUTs, the
placement and routing of LUTs, and the timing analysis step. The purple box indicates the steps to
generate the final bitstream followed by programming the FPGA.
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the required expertise in writing HDL codes, to use FPGAs for his/her need. This alternative is
called High-Level Synthesis (HLS), and it can compile high-level programming language code
to a functionally equivalent HDL code. Xilinx Vivado HLS [135] and Intel High-level synthesis
compiler [70] are examples of tools which provide this functionality. The FPGA synthesis tool
processes the HDL code and creates a bitstream file used to program the FPGA.
The above two programming methods are available to the users of cloud FPGAs. So the users
can either submit their hardware design as HDL codes or as a high-level language program. A user,
even without much knowledge of hardware design, can start from a high-level language and run
an HLS tool locally to create HDL codes for uploading to the clouds. The cloud service provider
takes the source codes of user designs and integrates user logic with their IP cores (called shell
on Amazon platforms) to build a bitstream file. This bitstream file is then loaded on an FPGA.
In the current commercial setting, the cloud provider has full control over the compilation and
deployment of user logic as it has to happen in an Amazon cloud node [13].
2.3 Architecture of FPGA clouds
Fig. 3 depicts a typical architecture of a cloud platform with FPGAs. FPGA boards are connected
with the servers using PCIe wires. PCIe wires are the de facto standard for the communication
between a server and the FPGA in commercial FPGA clouds [101]. The cloud service providers
divide the programmable resources on an FPGA into two parts: (1) the area for implementing the
shell, and (2) the area where users can implement customized logic. The shell includes Peripheral
Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) modules, DDR4 DRAM controllers, and control modules,
to enable the communication with the servers and DRAM. In Amazon EC2 F1 instances, one out of
FPGA board
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FPGA
User 1
3
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party 
IP
User 0
PCIe
module
IP core
User 0's 
HDL code
FPGA design 
flow
Cloud
Fig. 3. Architecture of an FPGA in the cloud. The four different threat models considered in this
paper are (1) malicious cloud providers, (2) malicious co-tenants, (3) malicious IP providers, and
(4) malicious FGPA toolchain. These are indicated in the figure by devil icons in the shell (PCIe
module and IP core), user 1’s logic, 3rd party IP core, and the FPGA design flow, respectively.
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four DDR4 DRAM controllers is implemented in the shell, and the other three can be implemented
in the customized logic [14]. Typically, the cloud provider’s logic (shell) interacts with user logic via
Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) protocols [14]. On the CPU side, the software development kit
provides the application programming interfaces (APIs), so the users with little FPGA experiences
can still interact with FPGAs easily [12]. In the modern commercial clouds like Amazon EC2 F1,
an FPGA is not allowed to be shared by multiple users due to security concerns [18]. However,
researchers envision that multi-tenant cloud FPGAs will be realized soon, as it is more cost-effective
for both the cloud providers and the users to share resources. Also, the security of multi-tenant
cloud FPGAs is an active research area. Thus we will survey recent works on the attacks and
defenses on multi-tenant FPGAs as well.
3 THREAT MODELS
To understand the possible threats posed to the cloud FPGA users, we categorize the threat models
into four types: (1) malicious cloud providers, (2) malicious cloud users/co-tenants, (3) malicious IP
providers, and (4) malicious toolchains. Fig. 3 illustrates where the threats reside in the architecture
of an FPGA cloud.
Malicious cloud providers. In the early days of cloud security research, one of the leading
security concerns of users was the privacy of their data stored/processed in the clouds [9, 27]. In
traditional threat models of cloud security, the cloud service providers are generally assumed to be
untrustworthy, so a user needs to implement his/her security measures to protect him/herself in
the clouds. Additionally, the users on the same cloud platform can be a threat to other users, too.
However, a malicious cloud model is stricter than the malicious user model because a cloud provider
has all the privileges to the platform, including physical access and full control of the computation
resources. A typical defense against malicious cloud providers is the use of fully-homomorphic
encryption [46, 128].
Fully-homomorphic encryption allows computation on encrypted data. Users can encrypt their
private data on their computers and send the encrypted data to the cloud. Computation on the
encrypted data is performed in the cloud. After the computation, the cloud sends the result back, still
in the encrypted form. The user decrypts the encrypted result and gets the result of the computation
on his/her private data. As the computation on the cloud is performed completely on encrypted data,
the cloud provider is unable to extract any secrets in the user data. Fully-homomorphic encryption is
a good way to eliminate the requirement of a trusted cloud. However, it is computationally intensive,
and it can take hundreds or even thousands of seconds to complete the bootstrapping operation,
which is the most important operation to realize fully-homomorphic encryption schemes [47, 109].
Researchers are developing new encryption constructions and implementations to improve the
performance of fully-homomorphic encryption [17, 26, 47]. Also, people have incorporated the
homomorphic encryption techniques into secure processor architecture designs as well [127].
Malicious co-tenants. Besides the security threats from a malicious cloud provider, threats from
malicious users/co-tenants need to be considered. The basic principle of cloud computing is that
all the users can dynamically have a share of the large computation resource pool. Due to this, a
victim user can be allocated close to a malicious user. Moreover, the victim and the malicious user
might even share some computation resources. Although, in general, the computation resources
used by different users are logically isolated, the computation resources are likely to be physically
connected due to the shared hardware platform. Attackers can leverage such a shared hardware
platform to perform a variety of attacks such as side-channel attacks, fault-injection attacks, and
establishment of covert channels, which are discussed in the following sections of the paper.
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Moreover, the business model of cloud computing pushes the economically-motivated cloud
service providers not to act maliciously. Thus, a modern trend in cloud computing research is to
consider cloud providers as partners of the users [2]. These providers help protect the security
of their customers. For example, cloud providers can apply moving target defense strategies to
actively migrate virtual machines within their computing infrastructures [94]. This bounds the
side-channel information leakage as the attacker has to find the new location of the victim before
it can carry on the side-channel attack.
Malicious IP providers. The modern hardware design process is very complicated and time-
consuming. Practitioners need to integrate 3rd-party intellectual property (3PIP) cores to speed
up the development process. This gives attackers a leeway to introduce malicious IPs, and the IPs
can be exploited later to leak information, e.g., via covert channels [48, 49, 51, 54, 124]. This threat
requires the attacker or the attacker’s logic to be present in the proximity of the target FPGA fabric.
Thus, the attacker can collect leaked information. So, either the cloud provider or a cloud co-tenant
has to be malicious as well. However, the vulnerabilities are introduced in the design phase of the
victim system, so we consider it as a separate security threat. This security threat is similar to
those in the untrusted supply chain of electronics [58, 111] and Trojan insertions in pre-silicon
hardware [62, 77]. Due to this, the usual countermeasures, such as hardware Trojan detection
tools [61, 114], can be implemented to detect malicious hardware design and IP cores which leak
information through their digital output channels. However, novel covert channel communications
enabled by a cloud FPGA environment require the immediate attention of the cloud providers and
customers. Such covert channel communications are discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Malicious FPGA tools. Adversaries can reverse-engineer commercial FPGA design tools and
embed malicious functionalities in the toolchain. This way, malicious tools can alter the compiled
hardware design. Under this threat model, the adversary can inject Trojans in a design. This
maliciously-altered design behaves functionally and formally equivalent to the original design
throughout the design flow until the tool writes the design as a bitstream configuration file [84].
4 ATTACKS
Having explained the threat models in the context of cloud FPGAs, we turn our attention to different
attacks proposed by researchers. These attacks are grouped according to their threat models.
4.1 Malicious Cloud Providers
Direct sensitive data leakage. In a cloud without programmable hardware, all the computation
and the data are contained in one container (virtual machine). Each container is isolated from
another in the hypervisor layer. In the case of a cloud with programmable hardware attached,
an attacker with system privilege can tamper with the logic or tap the communication between
the FPGA fabric and the processor. This can enable him/her to steal the secret data. In current
commercial FPGA-enabled clouds, the FPGA boards connect to the processors via the PCIe protocol.
Thus, the cloud provider can intercept the communication between the FPGA boards and the
processors with ease.
Intellectual property theft [21, 98]. The most common use of cloud FPGAs is to implement
hardware accelerators for specific computation tasks. The IP of such an accelerator developed and
owned by a developer should be protected. Since the developer hands over the bitstream files of
the IP cores to the cloud providers, a malicious cloud provider can access the RTL design of the IP
core. Bitstream reverse engineering techniques can enable this [21, 98]. Thus, a malicious provider
can steal the design IP and replicate the accelerator on another FPGA.
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Fig. 4. Remote power analysis attack for a multi-tenant FPGA [115]. The side-channel analysis
(SCA) is performed through the power distribution network (PDN) in spite of the logical isolation
between the victim logic and the sensor.
Tampering with user logic. A malicious cloud provider can access the user’s RTL design. So,
during the integration of the user’s design with the shell in the cloud FPGA, the providers can
introduce malicious modifications in the design. This security threat is also known as hardware
Trojans that have been studied for decades [132]. On cloud FPGAs, the Trojans can leak sensitive
information, which has been protected by other schemes in traditional cloud computing platforms.
Also, the Trojans can sometimes be inserted automatically [74]. One of the future challenges is
to provide a remote attestation feature which allows a remote user to verify the integrity and
authenticity of his/her designs in a cloud FPGA. This feature might be similar to the remote
attestation provided by Intel SGX [33].
4.2 Malicious Co-Tenants
In a multi-tenant FPGA model, many users, including potential adversaries, will share the same
FPGA fabric. As the multi-tenant model allows a malicious user to implement his/her design
close to a victim, recent research has focused on the security concerns in multi-tenant FPGAs. In
particular, remote side-channel attacks [115, 142] and remote fault-injection attacks [3, 87] have
been demonstrated. In this subsection, we survey the existing works on how a malicious co-tenant
can use the programmable logic on a cloud FPGA to launch attacks. Note that an adversary can
launch these attacks without any administrative privileges.
Side-channel attacks. The attack methods that exfiltrate information that is not leaked through
standard digital output channels are called side-channel attacks. Power side-channel [79, 89],
timing side-channel [28, 78], electromagnetic side-channel [29, 43], and photonic-emission side-
channel [80, 117] are a few examples of side-channels. An attacker must collect the side-channel
information of victim devices in these attacks. Hence, researchers have believed for a long time that
the side-channel attacks can be launched only by the attackers with physical access to the devices.
However, the ability to program the hardware deployed in the cloud is similar to having physical
access to the device. This allows the attackers to monitor the side-channel information remotely in
the physical environment, as shown in Fig. 4. The power consumption of a victim logic disturbs the
power distribution network on the FPGA, and measuring this disturbance allows the attacker to
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estimate the power consumption of the victim. Remote power-based side-channel attacks have been
demonstrated in the literature [115, 142]. Moreover, crosstalk between FPGA long wires (a specific
type of routing resource on FPGAs) can also serve as a method to leak information [107]. Since this
is an active research area, we provide a detailed survey on side-channel attacks in Section 5.
Fault-injection attacks. In fault-injection attacks, an attacker injects faults in the execution
process of a computation task. Thus, the device produces wrong outputs at the output ports. This
problem can have severe implications in a cryptographic system. In such a system, faulty outputs
can lead to a successful recovery of the secret key in the system [60]. Traditionally, an attacker
injects faults by manipulating power or clock signals, or by electromagnetic pulses. These methods
require physical access to the target device. However, using FPGAs shared with a victim, an attacker
can build an on-chip fault injector and tamper with the computation of the victim.
To demonstrate a successful fault-injection attack on multi-tenant FPGAs, Krautter et al. im-
plemented a large number of ROs and program them to oscillate at a very high frequency [83].
Because the power distribution network is shared among all tenants on the same FPGA fabric,
by toggling the ROs, the attacker can manipulate the propagation delay in the whole chip. Thus,
timing violations can occur in the circuit, causing faulty results in the computation. By triggering
timing violation on the FPGA, Krautter et al. injected faults in an AES process running on the same
chip. Note that this does not require any physical or logical connection to the attacker’s circuit [83].
Since the high oscillation rate may increase the power consumption drastically, the chip may have
to be shut down due to excessive heating. This problem can be addressed, as explained next.
Mahmoud et al. improved the fault-injection attack by proposing a delay-sensing circuit. This
delay-sensing circuit fine-tuned the parameters of the ROs such that the ROs draw enough power
to slow down the target circuit, but not so much that the chip shuts down [87].
Building ROs is not the only way to generate huge power consumption on an FPGA. Alam et al.
introduced a new way to inject faults in multi-tenant FPGAs remotely. By repeatedly triggering
memory writing collision (writing to the same address simultaneously in a dual-port RAM with
opposite values), the attacker can create short circuits in the RAM [3]. This results in massive
power consumption in the chip. By exploiting this phenomenon, one can launch a fault-injection
attack on an FPGA chip. This attack is stealthier than RO-based attacks because the memory
collision can be created during runtime. Such mechanisms, which trigger faults during runtime
with unsuspicious circuits, cannot be detected by a bitstream analysis tool, unlike RO based methods,
because bitstream analysis tools can detect ROs. Moreover, a dual-port RAM is a common design
component in modern hardware system design, which makes the attack more powerful.
Denial-of-service attacks. One property of concern for both the cloud providers and the users
is the availability of the cloud platform. Denial-of-service (DoS) attackers target the availability
of this platform. On an FPGA+CPU heterogeneous cloud, an attacker can launch a remote DoS
attack on the FPGA [55]. By programming a malicious circuit that switches on and off frequently, a
significant voltage drop is created on the FPGA, and the FPGA shuts down to protect itself. An
FPGA shut down by voltage emergency requires manual power-cycling of the device.
Matas et al. further optimized the RO-based DoS attack by showing how to find the shortest
path on an FPGA to form malicious (fastest oscillating) ROs [90]. They used GoAHEAD, a tool for
implementing partial reconfiguration of FPGAs, to search for the optimal paths [20]. The attack,
when implemented on a Xilinx Alevo U200 datacenter card with 1.182 million LUTs, can potentially
waste over 2kW power, which is way beyond the power budget of any FPGA [90].
RowHammer attacks. Interestingly, in an FPGA+CPU heterogeneous system, the FPGA has a
unique privilege to access the DRAM without being detected by any monitoring mechanism in the
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Fig. 5. An illustration of power covert channels among CPU, GPU, and FPGAs that share the same
power supply unit [50]. Note that this attack does not even require the components to share the
same power distribution network.
CPU. Also, the FPGA can bypass the cache in the processor and launch a rowhammer attack (i.e.,
flipping the bits in DRAM by repeated accesses) twice as fast as the traditional rowhammer attack
launched by a CPU [131]. Consequently, the rowhammer from an FPGA to a DRAM can trigger
four times as many bit-flips as the CPU initiated attacks. By exploiting this vulnerability, one can
tamper with the data and possibly the control flow of the program in the system.
4.3 Malicious IP Providers
To design a complex modern system, designers usually need to integrate third-party IP cores into
their systems. While these third-party IP cores can provide excellent performance and reduce
the time to market, they can be security threats to the system. If a malicious IP is introduced in
the system, it can leak information or tamper with the computation and the data in the system.
Researchers have studied this topic for decades as hardware Trojans. Interested readers can read
other survey papers focusing on hardware Trojans [23, 77, 132]. The unique challenge for exploiting
Trojans in the cloud FPGAs is how to leak the information stealthily, which is also called covert
channel communication. In the remainder of this subsection, we present how a Trojan circuit can
generate side-channel information to send out secrets to a malicious listener. In particular, we show
how one transmit over power, crosstalk in long wires, and thermal channels.
Power covert channels. The idea of voltage manipulations used in power side-channel attacks
can be extended to establish covert channels on multi-tenant FPGAs. An example of this is the
work done by Gnad et al. in [54]. They have demonstrated high-speed covert-channel (8MBit/s)
communication. The transmitter of the covert channel uses ROs to generate measurable voltage
spikes according to the secret data to be transmitted. The receiver, which is another tenant on the
same FPGA chip, uses another set of ROs to measure the voltage spikes. The attacker designs both
the transmitter and the receiver. This enables the attacker to modulate the transmitted signal leading
to robust communication, which can work in the presence of environmental noise introduced by
other tenants on the same FPGA fabric.
Establishing such power covert channels can be challenging if the receiver and the transmitter
are on separate dies. However, Giechaskiel et al. demonstrated such an attack on cloud FPGAs in
[49]. They established a power covert channel on cloud FPGAs that are on separate dies. They use
Xilinx UltraScale+ FPGAs for this. UltraScale+ FPGAs used by cloud providers like Amazon and
Huawei have three distinct dies that are connected and powered through a silicon interposer. Thus,
even though the receiver and the transmitter are on separate dies, they still share the same power
supply through the silicon interposer. A successful covert channel, operating at more than 4.6Mbps
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Fig. 6. Establishment of a communication channel using long wires in Xilinx FPGAs [51]. The H
and the L on the receiver stand for high and low delay values respectively.
with an accuracy of over 97.6%, is established in such a setup. Moreover, they showed that the
channel is present for all combinations of the three dies as receiver and transmitter.
Sharing a power supply unit in a computing system (e.g., one cloud computing instance), as
shown in Fig. 5, allows malicious attackers to create a covert channel between FPGA boards, and
even from a CPU or a GPU to an FPGA [50]. The authors demonstrated that by creating fluctuations
in the supply voltage provided by a shared power supply unit, an attacker can send information
stealthily to a sink FPGA, which is actively monitoring its voltage by using ROs. The attacker
used high power consumption of the source device (FPGA/CPU/GPU) to indicate a logic 1, and
low power consumption to represent a logic 0. However, one cannot simply use the absolute RO
frequency on the sink FPGA to find out the message sent from the source reliably. This is because
the power supply units and voltage regulators on the sink board can tolerate voltage fluctuations to
some extent. To solve this problem, Giechaskiel et al. implemented stressor ROs on the sink FPGA
to drain extra power, so the voltage change in the supply voltage can be more measurable on the
sink FPGA. Also, the authors introduced a new metric to detect the power consumption changes on
the source device more reliably. According to an evaluation on Artix 7 boards, this covert channel
can achieve a bandwidth of 6.1bps with over 90% accuracy. Similarly, a CPU or a GPU can switch
between high and low workload to send bits over the same covert channel to an FPGA.
Crosstalk in long wires. Crosstalk phenomenon in long wires can be exploited to launch covert-
channel communication as well [51]. The attacker is assumed to have a malicious IP core as a part
of the victim logic. It is also assumed that the attacker’s logic is on the same FPGA fabric and is
placed close to the victim’s logic. Since the adversary is the designer of the IP core, he/she can
define the internal placement and routing of his/her blocks. Thus, the attacker can force his/her
cores to use specific routing resources, in particular long wires. The attack, illustrated in Fig. 6,
exploits the phenomenon that the delay of FPGA long wires depends on the logical state of nearby
wires. In particular, when the transmitter wire (the long wire in the victim design) carries a logic
1, the delay of the nearby receiving wire (the long wire in the attacker’s design) is lower than
it would be if the transmitter wire carried a logic 0. An RO involving the receiver long wire can
measure the delay of the receiver wire. This reveals the logic state of the nearby transmitter long
wire. Thus, a covert-channel is created for attackers to leak sensitive information from a victim
hardware design. This covert channel can work effectively, even in the presence of power and
temperature fluctuations. More importantly, the malicious IP core in the victim’s logic provides
legitimate functionality while acting as a Trojan, and it does not contain additional logic. This
makes it challenging to detect such a Trojan using current Trojan detection tools [61, 114]. It is
worth noting that this attack mechanism does not depend on the rate at which the signals switch.
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 2020.
Security of Cloud FPGAs: A Survey 0:13
Reconfig. 
period
Waiting 
period
Heating 
period
Idle 
period
Reconfig. 
period
Sensing 
period
Time
Transmitter
Receiver
Fig. 7. Establishment of thermal covert channel on cloud FPGA [124]. The transmitter uses 4 FPGAs
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reconfiguration period on the receiver side represents a temperature higher than the un-heated
FPGAs, but lower than the heated FPGAs.
In fact, even when the signal in the transmitter wire is static, the attacker can differentiate between
a logic 0/1 on the wire.
Giechaskiel et al. extended the idea of [51] in [48]. They investigated a setup with multiple
transmitters and a single receiver in detail. They considered two configurations of the relative
placement of the transmitters and the receiver: (1) the two transmitters are on the same side of
the receiver (RTT) and (2) the receiver is sandwiched between the transmitters (TRT). In RTT, the
transmitter closest to the receiver affects the RO frequency on the receiver. In the TRT configuration,
both the transmitters have a roughly equal effect on the RO frequency of the receiver. An attacker
can use the TRT configuration to increase the bandwidth or to reduce errors in transmissions.
The effect of crosstalk in long wires was characterized in [106]. To perform this characterization,
the authors proposed a new metric to capture the difference in the periods of the RO for the cases
when the transmitter value is 0 and when it is 1. This helps remove the variability in the individual
ROs. Experiments showed that this new metric is successful in removing the dependence of the
characterization metric on the RO frequency. Hence, it can characterize the leakage more accurately.
A similar characterization effort for cloud FPGAs was made in [52]. The main challenge in
performing this analysis on the cloud FPGAs is the restriction imposed by some cloud providers
on the users’ designs. Providers like Amazon prohibit combinatorial loops [8]. To bypass this
checking on the Amazon cloud, researchers introduced two RO designs in [52]. These RO designs
are described in Section 5.2.
Thermal covert channel. Most of the covert channels in the literature require the designs of
attackers and victims to be present on the same FPGA chip, i.e., a multi-tenant FPGA setup. However,
cloud providers have not adopted the multi-tenant FPGA model yet. There exists a covert channel
on the cloud FPGAs which does not require a multi-tenant setup. The covert channel described by
Tian et al. in [124] is an example. It exploits the temporal sharing of a single FPGA. This channel
can transmit data stealthily on a single-tenant cloud FPGA. The transmitter heats an FPGA by
operating many ROs. Then, the transmitter turns off the ROs, leaves the cloud, and the receiver
uses the same FPGA. The receiver can measure the temperature of that FPGA with ROs. This is
possible because the frequency of an RO depends on the temperature of the FPGA. The bandwidth
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of such a thermal covert-channel depends on the number of FPGAs used simultaneously. Fig. 7
illustrates how a binary string can be transmitted and received by the temporal sharing of four
cloud FPGAs simultaneously. This covert channel was demonstrated on the cloud FPGAs in Texas
Advanced Computing Center in [124].
4.4 Malicious FPGA Tools
Users expect that a legitimate vendor provides the FPGA design tools. However, if an attacker
can inject malicious functionalities into the toolchain, a malicious bitstream and hence, malicious
hardware can be built on the cloud FPGAs [84]. The malicious modification in the compiled design
does not show up in the output until the bitstream is generated. Hence, the intermediate output
files, such as post-place simulation netlists are formally equivalent to the original design. The
attacker activates the malicious functionality only when the bitstream is being generated. The
malicious FPGA tool first replaces the functional blocks with their malicious counterparts. Then, in
the bitstream generation process, the design tool looks for these special malicious LUTs. If the tool
finds these malicious LUTs, it reconfigures them to activate the Trojan. The authors demonstrate a
privilege escalation attack using this malicious design flow on the free and open-source Lattice
iCE40 design flow [84].
5 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we detail the recent research on two popular topics: (1) remote power side-channel
attacks on cloud FPGA systems and (2) variants of RO designs on FPGAs, as a building block in
many attacks, to bypass the design restrictions enforced by cloud providers.
5.1 Remote power side-channel attacks
Security researchers have studied power side-channel attacks extensively in the past decade [79, 89].
An attacker can exploit the fact that the data that the system processes affects the dynamic power
consumption of the system [79]. So, by observing the power consumption of the circuit, the
attacker can infer the secret key in the cryptographic hardware. This attack requires side-channel
information to be collected from the hardware. Consequently, it was believed that such attacks
could be carried out only if the attacker had physical proximity to the target system. However, in the
context of cloud FPGAs, a malicious user does not have physical access to the target FPGA. Hence,
all previous techniques would not work. This leads to recent works on remote power analysis. We
discuss those in this sub-section.
Threat model. In general, remote power analysis attacks assume that the adversary’s logic and
the victim’s logic are on the same remote FPGA fabric [115, 142]. So, the adversary has access to
some of the LUTs in the remote FPGA. In other words, the attacker can implement his/her logic on
some part of the shared multi-tenant remote FPGA. Although currently, the cloud FPGA providers
do not allow sharing of an FPGA by multiple users, as explained in Section 2, it is envisioned that
multi-tenant FPGAs will be realized soon for better efficiency in terms of cost and utilization.
Key idea. To launch a remote power analysis attack, an attacker has to implement a power monitor
on the FPGA fabric shared with the victim. For example, the attacker can monitor the power
consumption of a victim process by using time-to-digital converter (TDC) sensors. Using the power
traces collected by the on-chip power monitors, the attacker can perform a power side-channel
attack.
Attack method. A key component in the attack is the power distribution network (PDN) on FPGA
chips. The PDN handles the distribution of power to all the components on the FPGA [10]. The PDN
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Fig. 8. Illustration of a TDC sensor that uses a chain of buffers with latches to measure delay.
spans across different abstraction levels, from printed circuit board level to individual transistors
on the FPGA. The PDN consists of resistive, capacitive, and inductive elements in the form of a
power mesh. The power consumption of an FPGA chip at any instant depends on the logic that
is being operated at that time. The changes in logic values affect the voltage and current drawn
by the transistors in FPGA. These voltage fluctuations affect the delays of the other logic circuits
implemented on the same FPGA due to the shared PDN. Hence, measuring delays in one part of the
FPGA reveals information about power consumption in a different part of the FPGA. In particular,
the higher the fluctuations in the voltage, the higher is the change in the delays. So, the attacker
can monitor the power fluctuations on the FPGA by implementing appropriate delay sensors.
To this end, the attacker can implement a TDC, illustrated in Fig. 8, on the shared FPGA as a delay
sensor [115]. As the delays of the buffers in the TDC depend on the supply voltage, the change in
delays can be monitored as a proxy for voltage fluctuations. When a victim process becomes active
in a different region of a multi-tenant FPGA, it disturbs the PDN. This results in a change in the
delay values of the TDC sensor. Thus, the attacker can create a mapping between the power traces
and the delay values. This mapping can then be used to perform a standard Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) attack. Such an attack was demonstrated in [115]. The proof of concept for this
attack was demonstrated on a victim AES core operating at 24MHz on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
Two scenarios were considered: (1) when the sensor is placed close to the victim AES logic, with a
gap of just 4 FPGA slices, and (2) when the sensor is placed far from the AES core. In both cases,
the attacker can recover the AES key.
Alternate power sensors. As a different approach, Zhao et al. used ROs as power sensors to
monitor the power consumption on the FPGA [142]. They translated the frequencies of ROs into
the power traces based on a linear relationship. A remote power side-channel attack was shown to
be successful using this RO sensor setup.
Attacking the processor system. In an FPGA+CPU heterogeneous chip, like a Xilinx Zynq
system, an ARM processor system (PS) shares the PDN with the FPGA fabric (programmable logic
or PL). Zhao et al. demonstrated an attack that uses the PL to monitor the power consumption of the
PS [142]. By doing so, they recovered the control flow of the program in the PS. This vulnerability
made a simple power analysis on RSA possible. Similarly, an FPGA-to-processor correlation power
analysis has been demonstrated in [57]. The authors used a TDC on the FPGA to measure the
power traces of the processor. Using that, they attacked an AES core running on the processor with
111k to 127k power traces.
Cross-chip attacks. Using the remote power side-channel attack, an attacker can not only attack
the victim who is on the same chip as the attacker, but he/she can also launch a cross-chip attack.
This cross-chip attack works as long as two FPGA chips are sharing the same power supply on
the same board [116]. Due to the victim being on a separate chip, the attack is more challenging.
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Fig. 10. High switching activity components [81]: These designs are potential replacements for
classical ROs in fault injection attacks since they incur high power consumption as well. The in-
verter and the XNOR gates in the grey boxes in (a) are preserved to add delay and generate clock
glitches for the flip-flop. The circuit in (b) performs switching by using a high-frequency signal
from the Phase-locked loop (PLL) as the clock of the flip-flop.
The number of traces required for this attack on AES is 40× the number of traces required for the
attack in [115].
Experiments on Amazon clouds. In DATE’20, Glamocanin et al. published their results on
launching remote power side-channel attacks on AWS EC2 F1 instances [53]. They chose to use
TDC sensors for measuring power consumption on a cloud FPGA, and the results showed that they
could successfully break the secret keys of all 16 bytes of an open-source AES-128 core with 5× 105
traces. This result validated the feasibility of remote power side-channel attacks on a commercial
cloud platform, so this research area raises serious concerns.
Long wire leakage. Ramesh et al. showed that it is possible to exploit the crosstalk phenomenon in
long wires to extract a secret from a victim logic passively [107]. In the attack, the authors targeted
an automatically placed-and-routed AES core. They identified a vulnerable long wire in the victim
design, which carries secret information. This vulnerable long wire would act as the transmitter.
The attacker is assumed to manually place-and-route a long wire in the receiver RO such that it is
adjacent to the vulnerable (i.e., transmitter) long wire. After that, a side-channel attack based on
the long wire leakage is conducted successfully. In this attack, the attacker does not need to modify
the routing constraints of the victim logic. However, a successful attack relies on the fact that the
FPGA tool has created a vulnerable design.
5.2 Ring Oscillator Designs and their Variants.
ROs are a crucial component in a variety of attacks [48, 51, 106, 107, 142]. So, we survey different
RO designs and their variants that exist in the current literature.
Typically, an RO is composed of a self-looped chain of an odd number of inverters. Each inverter
can be instantiated on a LUT in an FPGA, as shown in Fig 9. The reason why a variety of attacks
rely on ROs is the sensitivity of the RO frequency to voltage and temperature fluctuations. However,
due to the possible use of ROs in attacks, AWS implements a netlist checking tool and blocks users
from implementing combinational loops (i.e., typical ROs) on their FPGAs. So, the basic design of
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an RO has been extended to designs that use a latch or a flip-flop as a transparent component like
a buffer [52]. Such designs are illustrated in Fig. 9 (b) and (c). An advantage of having sequential
elements in ROs is that it can fool a bitstream or netlist checking tool into believing that the design
does not contain a combinational loop. So, this technique can be used to hide the existence of
combinational ROs in the design from the checking tools, as demonstrated in [52].
The above-mentioned RO design variants can be used to replace classical ROs in both side-
channel and fault injection attacks. Researchers have come up with different designs that can incur
high switching activity, and thus imply a high power consumption [81]. These designs are shown
in Fig. 10, and they can be used in fault injection attacks as power wasters. These designs have the
oscillation property of an RO, but they are sequential circuits since a flip-flop is involved in the
loop. The main design principle of high switching activity components is to toggle values as fast as
possible. In the first design in Fig. 10, a self-clocked flip-flop is used, and the clock signal is generated
by an XNOR gate which generates glitches. The second design in Fig. 10 uses a phase-locked loop
(PLL) at its highest frequency to generate a high-speed clock. On an iCE40-HX8K FPGA, the current
generated by 6000 combinational ROs and 6000 PLL based sequential oscillators in Fig. 10 (b) is
measured to be 291.3 mA, and 240.9 mA, respectively [81]. Note that the sequential oscillator cannot
consume as much power as combinational ROs because it cannot run as fast as a combinational RO.
Still, the sequential design is powerful enough to launch fault attacks on FPGAs.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
Several researchers have proposed methods to counter the attacks mentioned in the previous
sections [56, 81, 82, 105]. These methods can be classified broadly into two categories: defenses
implemented by a tenant and defenses implemented by a cloud provider.
6.1 Untrusted Clouds
Bitstream encryption. One way to prevent bitstream reverse engineering is to encrypt the
bitstream [133]. The encrypted bitstream is decrypted only on the FPGA. Many commercial FPGAs
support this feature. However, so far, to the best of our knowledge, commercial heterogeneous
cloud providers (e.g., Amazon EC2 F1) require users to submit RTL designs in plaintext [13]. The
platform provider then integrates such a design with the shell (i.e., the PCIe modules and the
control modules for communicating with the servers). Before the generated bitstream file is loaded
onto an FPGA, the cloud platform providers check the design for prohibited design patterns like
combinational loops. Thus, commercial clouds do not support bitstream encryption. Apart from
this method, there are no perfect solutions to prevent bitstream reverse engineering.
Following the line of bitstream encryption, Bag et al. proposed a key management system to
manage the bitstream decryption process on FPGA [16]. They combined the concept of “bring your
own key” (BYOK) and key aggregate cryptosystem [100]. This way, the tenants can use their secret
keys for encrypting their bitstreams locally and securely transfer the keys to the cloud FPGAs
for decryption. A master public key provided by the FPGA vendor encrypts the encryption keys
used by each tenant. The master private key is embedded in the FPGAs and can decrypt the secret
keys of the users. These decrypted keys are then used for decrypting the corresponding encrypted
bitstream files. A malicious cloud provider does not have access to the secret keys without using
the FPGA, because the decryption for the individual secret keys occurs in the FPGA.
IP watermarking. IP watermarking is a technique that adds special modules into a hardware
design (IP core). It should be difficult for an attacker to detect and remove the embedded watermarks.
Moreover, the watermarks should be embedded such that the owner can prove the ownership
of the design when an IP dispute occurs. For example, [85] encodes watermarks in the unused
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LUTs in an FPGA, and the design is placed and routed around the watermark. As the location
of the watermark is known only to the designers, an attacker cannot detect which LUTs contain
the watermark bits. Some watermarking techniques incur extra area overhead to the design [85].
However, zero-overhead watermarking schemes exist. For example, one can modify the delay of
non-critical paths in the hardware design through routing, such that the delay information can
be considered as the unique watermark of the IP core [71]. Since this technique does not add any
hardware components, it has no additional hardware area overhead.
Traditional side-channel attacks and fault-injection protections.When the cloud provider
is untrustworthy, it is difficult for the user to protect him/herself against the cloud and the other
malicious tenants. This is because the user has no control over and no idea about who and what
will be sharing their FPGA, and he/she has to assume everyone else is potentially malicious to
him/her. One conservative method to design a secure system against side-channel attacks and fault
injection attacks is to follow the traditional security practices and assume that the attackers have
physical access to the device. Researchers have studied side-channel attacks and fault-injection
attacks for decades. We generally understand how to secure a hardware design against side-channel
attacks (e.g., using masking or hiding principles [89]) and fault-injections (e.g., using fault-injection
defections [38, 60]). However, to defend against such a strong physical adversary, the area and the
performance overheads of the design are typically very high. Thus, these kinds of countermeasures
may be an overkill for the scenario of cloud FPGAs, where the attackers may not be able to precisely
measure the side-channel information and inject faults using the on-board malicious circuits. We
are still seeking more efficient ways to secure the designs on cloud FPGAs, while not relying on
the trustworthiness of the cloud providers.
6.2 Trusted Clouds
Bitstreamcheckers. If a cloud provider is trustworthy, a non-malicious user can be at an advantage,
since the cloud provider can use the unique insights it observes from the whole platform to
implement more powerful countermeasures. For example, the provider can implement a bitstream
checker before programming an FPGA. This bitstream checker can identify malicious circuit
structures and raise a red flag if any such structures are found. The provider can use this method
of checking the bitstream to defend against side-channel attacks and fault-injection attacks. For
instance, AWS does not allow a user to deploy ROs and combinational loops on their FPGAs [8].
Being one of the pioneers in this research direction, Gnad et al. built the first bitstream checker
called FPGA antivirus [56]. It checks for the known patterns of malicious circuits. They identified
one typical pattern for fault injectors and two different patterns for the sensor designs used in
side-channel attacks. Previous research has demonstrated that a fault can be injected by voltage or
current fluctuations on the FPGA fabric [83, 87].
Gnad et al. identified two characteristics of an on-board fault injector: (1) a large number of
combinational loops, where the “largeness” threshold is determined empirically; (2) a common
input to these combinational loops to synchronously toggle the behavior of the loop. The rationals
behind these two characteristics are: (1) to launch a fault-injection attack, the attacker has to be able
to control a circuit that can incur high switching activities and extremely high power consumption;
(2) the large circuit has to be synchronically controlled, otherwise, the large power consumption
will be flattened, so the current will not surge beyond the current limit of the FPGA.
There are two ways to launch power side-channel attacks on multi-tenant FPGAs. One uses
ROs as sensors, and the other uses a time-to-digital converter (TDC) as a sensor [115]. Gnad et al.
suggested two types of characteristics to identify the on-board sensors from bitstream files. To
identify the RO sensors, they looked for combinational loops with output ports. To identify the
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TDC sensors, they checked for timing violations on every wire. These checks for timing violations
apply to other sensors that exploit timing violations as well. Even if a single bit is unstable during
a voltage fluctuation, an attacker can use that bit to measure the delay on the FPGA.
Based on the patterns of malicious circuits mentioned above, one can catch all malicious circuits
known by then. However, as the authors in [56] have noted, potentially, there are more ways to
launch side-channel and fault attacks on-board. So, this pattern-based approach needs to be updated
frequently to catch up with new attacks [56].
Soon after the original FPGA antivirus was built, Krautter et al. proposed new attack variants
that can evade the detection of the original FPGA antivirus [81]. These new attacks rely on novel
RO structures designed using sequential circuits [120], so analysis tools that look only for com-
binational loops cannot detect such RO structures. To keep FPGA antivirus up to date, Krautter
et al. reformulated the necessary characteristics of potentially malicious circuits that can launch
fault-injection attacks and side-channel attacks [81]. They concluded that to detect side-channel
attacks, a bitstream checker needs to look for sensors that can detect delay changes on board. Thus,
they identified three unique patterns of malicious circuits for side-channel attacks: (1) paths with
timing violations; (2) unusual data to clock connections; and (3) ROs. Likewise, they also summa-
rized the characteristics of malicious fault-injectors: (1) high current variation runtime behaviors;
(2) a large number of synchronized elements; (3) hardware primitives which can oscillate, e.g., ROs.
They combine static analysis and dynamic analysis in the new FPGA antivirus design. The static
analysis checks the structural properties of the design, and the dynamic analysis looks for possible
timing violation and estimates the power consumption based on real or random input stimuli. The
updated FPGA antivirus, when evaluated on Lattice FPGA, can detect all known malicious circuits
that can inject faults or observe side-channel information [81].
Similarly, Matas et al. presented another bitstream checker called FPGADefender [90]. FPGADe-
fender relies on static analysis of bitstream. It looks for structural signatures of malicious circuits.
This includes combinational loops with/without transparent latches, short circuits, antennas, large
fan-outs, disallowed port and path usage, and latches.
To counter the security threats from malicious FPGA tools, the authors in [84] suggested using
equivalence checking. This equivalence checking would reveal manipulations in the bitstream file.
However, as bitstream formats are not publicly documented, it is hard for third-party verification
tool vendors to offer solutions that prove equivalence. Thus, a call for open and publicly documented
bitstream formats wasmade in [84]. However, even if the bitstream formats are publicly documented,
as the design complexity increases, more sophisticated equivalence checking methods are needed.
One drawback of the bitstream checking approach is that the users need to rely on the cloud
providers to check the bitstreams. If the providers can check the bitstreams, they can reverse
engineer the designs submitted by users. This forces the users to trust the cloud providers.
Access control.On a trustworthy cloud, the provider can implement several defenses. For example,
the provider can enforce proper access control policies between a processor and its hardware
peripherals on an FPGA. Elnaggar et al. introduced a new security threat on a partially reconfigurable
FPGA. They assume that the reconfiguration manager and the internal/processor configuration
access port (ICAP/PCAP) are compromised [37]. This leads to three new attack scenarios: (1)
malicious or unregistered bitstream files can be loaded to the FPGAs; (2) unauthorized software
can access user logic; (3) attackers can redirect messages between a software application and its
custom logic to a malicious application.
To defend against a compromised reconfiguration manager and ICAP/PCAP, [37] suggested
adding a secure authentication module (SAM), a task/application loading module, and a secure task
database into the system. The SAM distributes a shared secret key to users and asks them to embed
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Fig. 11. Physical isolation by blocking the adjacent wires upto a distance of 3 from the potential
transmitter wire [51].
the key in their applications and hardware modules. By actively running a challenge-response
protocol between a software application and its hardware task modules, the SAM can verify the
authenticity of applications and tasks, and the applications and tasks can mutually verify the
authenticity of each other. Also, the issue of running an unregistered hardware task (or task hiding
in [37]) can be remedied by introducing a secure task database and enforcing every authorized user
to register her tasks in the database.
The authors in [63, 139] introduced access control policies or an encryption core to secure the
communication between the processors and the hardware accelerators on the FPGA. However, they
overlook the threat of a malicious co-tenant on the same FPGA who can launch side-channel [115,
142] and fault-injection attacks [83].
Physical isolation. The most effective method to prevent long wire crosstalk effect-based attacks
is physical isolation. Huffmire et al. proposed the concept of physical moats on FPGAs to isolate the
hardware cores of different users [68]. The moats are implemented using disabled switchboxes (SBs)
surrounding each hardware core. The width of the moats (the number of disabled SBs) depends
on the number of SBs that can be skipped in routing a long wire on the FPGA. In practice, as it is
suggested in [51], minimum width of three, as depicted in Fig. 11, should be enforced to minimize
long wire crosstalk. Also, if the location of the attacker on the FPGA can be known and constrained,
then one can use the FPGA Trust Zone technique proposed in [75] to avoid the FPGA regions
adjacent to the attacker.
As the first step in automating secure routing to mitigate the crosstalk effect in long wires,
Seifoori et al. extended an existing open-source FPGA routing tool, PathFinder, to build a routing
tool to prevent crosstalk-based side-channel leakage [118]. To use the proposed tool, users need to
annotate the trusted IP cores and sensitive FPGA nets (e.g., the ones carrying secret keys). In the
proposed tool, Seifoori et al. proposed four routing strategies. (1) Block-2NN, meaning that no net
is allowed to use the nearest and the second nearest long wires of a sensitive net; (2) Block-NN,
meaning the nearest long wires of a sensitive net will not be occupied; (3) Block-Untrusted, no nets
from an untrusted IP module can be allocated adjacent to a sensitive net; (4) Lock-NN, meaning
the nearest long wires of a sensitive net can only be occupied by the nets originating from the
same module as the sensitive net. Using the Verilog-to-Routing benchmark [110], they found that
the four strategies incur 1.91% to 7.69% overhead in channel width on average with respect to the
baseline, and secure routing introduces 0.12% to 1.18% increase in critical path delay on average.
An automatic hardware isolation framework, HILL, was presented in [86]. Given a list of security-
critical net names in a design by the designers, HILL can automatically generate a constraint file
for an FPGA tool (e.g., Vivado or Xilinx ISE) to place the critical instances (e.g., LUTs) in the middle
of the hardware design and route all the other instances in a spiral manner around the critical
instances. Thus, the critical instances are protected by the non-critical instances in the protected
design from an attacker who is placed outside of the design. If the width of the surrounding
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non-critical instances is sufficient, the attacker cannot exploit the crosstalk phenomenon to leak
information from critical instances. Moreover, for some long wires which cannot be placed in the
middle of a design, like IO buffers, the authors suggested adding two dummy long wires to be
adjacent to the vulnerable long wires to obfuscate the observation of an attacker.
Runtime monitors. Runtime monitoring is a general defense methodology that deploys perfor-
mance monitors on the FPGAs to detect suspicious behaviors during runtime. Without compromis-
ing the users’ privacy in the hardware designs, the cloud provider can deploy runtime monitors
on the FPGAs to monitor the running status of the FPGAs. For example, ROs were proposed to
check the delay variations [24, 143], and TDC was introduced in [144] for sensing nanosecond-scale
voltage variations. These sensor designs were all proposed before the first remote side-channel
attacks on FPGAs were conducted.
To take one step further in this direction, Provelengios et al. characterized the behavior of a power
distribution network on an FPGA under a power-based fault-injection attack [105]. In particular,
they studied the geographic distribution of a voltage drop around a power waster (the source of
attacks, e.g., ROs). Essentially, the closer a circuit is to the power waster, the more voltage drop it
experiences. Based on this finding, one can build a distributed voltage monitor network on an FPGA
to identify, in real-time, the location of the malicious circuit. Then, the cloud provider can move
the suspicious user’s circuit to another single-tenant FPGA or remove the user from the cloud.
One drawback of using a runtime monitoring approach is that it can only detect active attacks
like fault-injections. The existing runtime monitors can not check whether there exists an attacker
in the chip who is monitoring the system quietly.
Active defenses. To counter the passive attacks, like side-channel attacks, a user can actively inject
noise into the power traces [82]. This paper introduced active fences between the victim circuits
and power side-channel attack circuits, as shown in Fig. 12. The fences are composed of ROs, and
these ROs can be activated by two approaches following the principles of hiding and masking,
respectively. To hide the secret information in the power traces, the active fences try to consume
power by operating the ROs appropriately, such that the overall power consumption is flat. To this
end, the active fences are controlled by an on-chip RO-based power sensor. For instance, if the
power sensor detects that the power consumption increases, the active fence decreases its power
consumption to flatten the power changes. The other way to control the active fences is to use a
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). This approach follows the principle of masking, and it
creates a noisy power profile for the attacker to measure. Experiments showed that by deploying
active fences, the number of required power traces for a successful attack increases by 2 to 3 orders
of magnitude. The authors also noted that the power sensor-activated fences using hiding principles
are more effective in defenses.
7 SECURING CLOUD COMPUTATION USING FPGAS
On traditional cloud computation platforms, users can not control the underlying hardware that
executes the computation. So, the users have to trust the cloud providers to handle their data
properly and securely. Since the introduction of Intel SGX [33], the users do not have to trust
the cloud provides. They need to trust only the manufacturers of the processors, i.e., Intel. This
bottom-up trust model shows that one can minimize the trusted computing base to a trusted
hardware like a processor. Cloud FPGAs, as programmable hardware in the clouds, can be used to
construct an alternate trusted computing base for users when the processors are not trustworthy.
We can use them as security monitors to check the behavior of the processor. Also, a programmable
trusted peripheral allows one to prove certain security properties of a processor or an application.
For example, a user can extract hardware fingerprints of cloud service instances and recover the
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: 2020.
0:22 Jin, et al.
Shared FPGA
Potential 
attacker
Potential 
attacker
Potential 
attacker
Protected 
block
Active Fence
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
R
O
 S
lic
e
D
E
M
U
X
S
e
n
s
o
r 
o
r 
P
R
N
G
Fig. 12. Active injection of noise into power traces by activating an appropriate number of
ROs [82].
architecture of the cloud infrastructures [125]. Looking into the future, different architectures
of FPGA clouds can emerge. For example, IBM Zurich is working on the cloudFPGA project and
proposing architectures for network-attached FPGAs [1]. This architecture allows the FPGA to
access the network directly and process network packets independent of the processors.
7.1 Architectural Supports
In 2012, Eguro and others envisioned an FPGA-based cloud computing platform [36]. In this
platform, the computation and data are sent to the cloud FPGA as encrypted data and an encrypted
bitstream. In the cloud FPGA, the FPGA manufacturer pre-loads a secure bootstrapper bitstream.
The secure bootstrapper shares a secret key with cloud clients and decrypts the data and bitstream
files. After that, the data is computed using the hardware design described by the bitstream. Before
the final results leave the cloud, they are encrypted again. This way, the client receives encrypted
results, which he/she can decrypt locally.
To extend the idea of FPGA-based trusted computing in the cloud, Arasu et al. proposed to use
the above methodology for building an FPGA-based trusted co-processor, Cipherbase [11]. It aims
at securing database operations. In the system architecture of Cipherbase, the whole database is
encrypted, and the key is known to Cipherbase. Any expression evaluations are outsourced to
Cipherbase. Because Cipherbase knows the secret keys, it can decrypt the data and evaluate the
requested expression on the plaintext data easily. This architecture makes sure that the untrusted
server which manages the database can have access only to the encrypted database, and the
co-processor can assist the server in performing typical database operations efficiently.
Xu et al. [137] proposed a similar idea as [36] to enable efficient privacy-preserving computation
in the cloud. [137] considered FPGAs as security containers and decrypts the data at the entry
point of the cloud FPGA. Then, the data is encrypted again upon leaving the FPGAs. The main
innovation in [137] is that the authors introduce proxy re-encryption to reduce the burden of key
management in [36]. The concept of proxy re-encryption allows users to use their own keys for
encryption. Moreover, the ciphertext encrypted by a user’s key can be converted to a ciphertext of
the same content encrypted by an FPGA’s key without decrypting the ciphertext. This allows the
user and the FPGA to exchange encrypted data without exchanging keys.
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7.2 Cryptographic Accelerators
The original purpose of introducing FPGAs into clouds was to enable the deployment of hardware
accelerators to speed up the computation. Naturally, complex cryptographic operations need to
be accelerated by hardware to satisfy the performance requirement in practice. In the rest of this
subsection, we review two categories of cryptographic algorithms that demand to be implemented
in hardware to improve their performance. The first one is fully/somewhat-homomorphic encryp-
tion [39, 46, 128], which was originally designed to allow computation over encrypted data in
clouds. The second type of algorithms that needs hardware acceleration extensively is post-quantum
cryptographic algorithms. These algorithms are the future direction of the cryptography for when
quantum computers will be realized [22, 30]. The third type is the privacy-preserving computation,
such as garbled circuit evaluation [138], which allows clouds to compute on user’s program without
leaking secrets.
Many hardware accelerator architectures of homomorphic encryption have been proposed and
implemented on FPGAs. For example, [104] proposed an architecture to accelerate the homomorphic
encryption scheme YASHE. The hardware accelerator was able to provide roughly two orders
of magnitude speedup compared with a software implementation of the same scheme by then.
However, YASHE is no longer considered secure after an attack proposed in [4]. FV somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme [39] was implemented in [112], which requires 26.67 seconds
for one homomorphic multiplication. Of the 26.67 seconds, only 3.36 seconds are used for actual
computation, and the rest is the data access overhead due to the usage of a large parameter set.
In fact, the large parameter size in secure homomorphic encryption schemes is the performance
bottleneck on data transfers, as observed in [104, 112, 113]. With a smaller parameter setting, one
recent work on accelerating the FV scheme shows 13 times performance improvement over a highly
optimized software implementation of the FV scheme [113]. Also, researchers have addressed other
performance bottlenecks as well. For instance, [32, 35] proposed new multiplier architectures, and
an improved Chinese Remainder Transformation accelerator was introduced in [34].
Although the NIST standardization competition of post-quantum cryptography is ongoing, the
hardware accelerators of the proposed signature schemes and key encapsulation schemes are being
investigated in [19, 129]. [129] presents a full FPGA implementation of a Niederreiter cryptosystem
based on Binary Goppa Codes. This design achieves three orders of magnitude speedup compared
to state-of-the-art software implementation. This shows a high potential of hardware accelerators
for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. More efforts have been presented in [19], which
evaluate the potential performance gains of FPGA hardware implementations of NIST post-quantum
competition candidates. The authors used HLS (High-level synthesis) tools for faster design-space
exploration, and the results can be considered as a strong indicator of the hardware performance
in the selection process of the NIST competition.
In addition, researchers have been implementing FPGA accelerators for privacy-preserving
techniques, e.g., Garbled Circuits [138], on the cloud. Garbled circuits, or secure function evaluation,
is a technique that allows secure two-party computation. Using this, two mutually untrusted
parties can jointly evaluate one function on their private inputs. MAXelerator was introduced
as an FPGA accelerator on clouds for privacy-preserving machine learning in a garbled circuit
form [69]. The authors noticed that most of the privacy-sensitive computation in machine learning
applications could be boiled down to multiply-accumulate operations, so they specifically used
FPGAs to accelerate the multiply-accumulate garbled circuit computation. Overall, they achieved
up to 57 times throughput improvement compared to the state-of-the-art software garbled circuit
framework. A general-purpose FPGA accelerator for one party (garbler) in a two-party garbled
circuit protocol was built by Huang et al. in [66]. They also implemented and demonstrated the
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FPGA accelerator on AWS instances, and they showed a 15 times speedup in garbler computation
compared to a software-based garbled circuit framework.
7.3 FPGA-based Security Primitives
Having programmable hardware in clouds allows users to construct their security primitives in
the clouds. For example, they can build their own physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [44, 65] to
identify individual FPGA chips. Many FPGA-based PUF designs were proposed and open-sourced
online for fostering future research. As the first cryptographically secure PUF, LPN-based PUF [64]
was implemented on a Zynq FPGA in a software/hardware co-design style, which perfectly fits
the model of cloud FPGAs attached to a server [72]. The current state-of-the-art lightweight PUF
design, interpose PUF (iPUF), which can resist all known attacks, was implemented in FPGAs as
well [96]. One can extend PUFs to construct more security applications. For example, a PUF can
be used for proof of execution in the cloud, which proves the identity of the device which runs
the requested computation [45]. Tian et al. instantiated decay-based DRAM PUFs [136] in AWS
F1 instances, and thus they can fingerprint each instance in AWS cloud [125]. Using these unique
fingerprints of cloud instances, they experimentally figured out the probability of renting the same
FPGA instance more than once, which provides unique insights for an attacker to launch further
attacks.
Besides PUFs, true random number generators (TRNGs) can also be built on cloud FPGAs as
an alternative to generating reliable randomness sources [102]. Most of the FPGA-based TRNG
designs take ROs as a core building block [40], but, unfortunately, ROs, being combinational loops,
are prohibited in the AWS clouds. One alternative approach is to exploit the metastability as a
random source. For example, [88] presents a programmable delay line based TRNG design. This
design does not require an RO as its building block. This demonstrates the possibility of building
private and reliable TRNGs in the cloud.
8 RELATED RECENT SURVEYS
We acknowledge recent surveys on (cloud) FPGA security. [141] surveyed attacks and defenses on
FPGAs in general and did not focus on the unique characteristics of cloud FPGAs. [93] focused on
the security issues of cloud FPGAs, but the scope was narrowed down to only the side-channel
attacks on cloud FPGAs, which is narrower than the scope of this paper. Similarly, [90] provided an
excellent resource to study side-channel and fault injection attacks, but cloud FPGAs are facing
more security issues than what they mentioned. [126] in 2017 presented a high-level overview of the
security issues in cloud FPGAs or FPGAs in data centers. However, as the security research on cloud
FPGAs is evolving rapidly, remote side-channel attacks, fault-injections, and covert channels were
not known by then, and therefore not covered in their paper. Nonetheless, some of the visionary
countermeasures mentioned in [126] are shown to be effective in later research, e.g., the bitstream
checkers and runtime monitoring. Last but not least, universities have started teaching courses on
cloud FPGA [122]. Such courses are an excellent starting point for researchers interested in cloud
FPGAs.
Our paper not only presents recent work on cloud FPGA security in a comprehensive and timely
manner but also surveys the related work on FPGAs to secure cloud computing. Thus, this survey
covers the security issues beyond the attacks and defenses of FPGA security in clouds.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Cloud FPGA is an emerging trend with several security-related open problems awaiting exploration.
From an attacker’s point of view, we believe that the current known attacks in Section 4 are still
an incomplete list of possible attacks on cloud FPGAs. More attacks are likely to be proposed in
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the future, such as side-channel attacks exploiting other side-channel leakage sources. Also, using
known information leakage sources, more information may be inferred. Notice that researchers
have implemented a power-based instruction disassembler on a microprocessor [99]. This means
that allowing attackers to observe the power consumption of the processor from the connected
FPGA fabric can potentially reveal more information than what has been demonstrated in [57, 142].
In the system model, we demand strong security measures that can be used by cloud clients
so that the clients do not need to trust the cloud providers. Ideally, the clients should be able to
remotely verify some security properties (e.g., integrity) of their logic in the clouds. In addition,
the clients may want to remotely verify the size of memory space using proof of space [108], the
authenticity of the platform using remote attestation [33], the aliveness of the program using proof
of aliveness [73], or the physical location of the data storage [25]. All of these traditional security
issues in cloud computing need to be extended to include the FPGA platform as well.
In a multi-tenant FPGA setting, more security mechanisms need to be in place to protect cloud
users from other malicious users. How to efficiently defend against existing side-channel attacks
and fault injection attacks without compromising the privacy of the user’s design is still an open
problem. Existing countermeasures fail to satisfy at least one of three requirements: low overhead,
protection against known attacks, and the privacy of users. Traditional countermeasures provide
strong security guarantees, but they incur significant hardware overhead. Bitstream checkers can
detect malicious circuit designs given the list of known attacks. However, this requires access to
cloud users’ hardware designs. Passive online detection and active defenses require their deployment
by the cloud providers and joint use to defend against side-channel and fault attacks.
We can redesign the architecture of FPGA clouds in such a way that the FPGA can support the
security features of the clouds and the FPGAs. For example, FPGAs can be used to support the
secure boot of computing systems [103]. Moreover, new FPGA cloud architectures can potentially
limit the capability of malicious cloud providers. [37, 63, 139] have effectively demonstrated new
architectures by enforcing access control policy between processors and FPGA logic, or encrypting
the messages transmitted between processors and FPGA logic. However, these mechanisms all
require the cloud providers to deploy such a method by themselves, so it still requires some trust in
the cloud providers. At least, trust in the infrastructure designers and manufacturers is needed if
these mechanisms are built in the infrastructure hardware.
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